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This article examines concern for fairness in the way in which loss is distributed when a company or 
financial institution facing financial difficulties is restructured.  It shows how this concern is often 
grounded in loose notions of fairness, or generalisations from one situation to another, rather than 
in detailed analysis.  Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, it builds an analytical frame for the 
fairness debate in debt restructuring.  It shows why rigour is important in identifying fairness 
concerns, in weighing them against other considerations, and in applying concerns which arise in 
one scenario to another, and illustrates the types of policy mistake or policy incoherence which can 
arise if this is not done.  
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We think of fairness as an intuitive concept, confident that as the colloquial expression goes ‘we 
will know it when we see it’. Substantive unfairness is usually associated with some sort of 
imbalance: between how one person is treated compared with another; between effort put in and 
reward gained; between what we legitimately expect and what we get; between how losses fall on 
the weak and upon the strong.  Procedural unfairness, too, reflects this sense of an uneven playing 
field:  between the rights which different parties have to participate in a process or between how 
favoured and unfavoured parties are treated, or between the rights of those in a powerful 
bargaining position and the rights of everyone else.  But not every case of imbalance will be unfair, 
 and many factors may vindicate the situation. Closer examination reveals a slippery concept, which 
eludes a single definition applicable to all contexts and which suffers from various levels of 
abstraction unless it is applied to a real situation. 
 
Indeed, if we rely on our intuition we face three risks.  First, we risk generalising from one situation 
to another when the situations ought properly to be differentiated from each other.  Secondly, to 
the extent that we suggest reform to address a fairness concern, that reform may be only weakly 
related to the real fairness issues in the particular context.  Finally, when we weigh fairness 
concerns against other considerations, we may have a poorly defined idea of what it is that we are 
putting in the balance.  This article argues that our repeated failure to identify systematically our 
fairness concerns in different types of debt restructuring in English law has led us into all three of 
these traps.   Drawing broadly on scholarship from diverse fields such as moral and political 
philosophy, biological sciences, psychology, organisation theory, group theory and economics, the 
article seeks to unpack the principles and the procedural demands which are bound up in some 
measure in our intuitive sense of what is fair, and to apply them in a rigorous way to three different 
types of debt restructuring: a restructuring of a small or medium sized enterprise (SME); a 
restructuring of a large corporate; and a restructuring of a financial institution in English law.  In 
each case, a fairly typical scenario is described to ground the analysis, which reveals repeated 
failure to distinguish one type of restructuring case from another, to identify accurately where the 
fairness concerns are lurking, and to decide what we are putting in the fairness bucket of the 
trade-off scales.1  In short, it reveals the policy mistakes which may arise if we give ‘our 
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 unscrutinised instincts an unconditional final say’. 2 
 
The analysis concentrates exclusively on fairness.  It does not consider the trade-off between 
fairness and other objectives (such as sustaining the putatively unfair situation because another, 
fairer outcome would cost more than the benefits it would deliver or would provide the wrong 
incentives for some of the stakeholders), or utilitarian objections (because a situation which 
differentiates between classes of stakeholder in its approach to the fairness of the case would 
make the stakeholders worse off overall), or with arguments that what we might consider to be 
questions of fairness should properly be reinterpreted as economic questions.  In short, its 
objective is not to argue that fairness per se should prevail over other considerations, but rather to 
explore, as an initial question, the quality of fairness in each of the situations with which it is 
concerned.   In each case the analysis has been divided between what are termed ‘principles of 
fairness’, which are the principles we apply to a given outcome to determine whether the result is 
fair, and procedural fairness made up of the factors which determine whether the process by 
which the outcome was arrived at was itself fair.  This division proved no easier to handle than the 
fairness notion itself, and the reader may on occasion take issue with the allocation of principles 
between procedure and substance, but given the law’s commitment to procedure some attempt to 
identify a line between outcome and procedure seemed essential.  
 
Finally, the extent to which notions of fairness can properly be said to be contingent upon history, 
geography and culture is controversial, but many scholars would argue that there are significant 
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 and important national value differences as to what is fair.3 As this article focuses on English law 
debt restructuring, an in-depth cross-cultural analysis is not attempted and the literature which is 
drawn upon focuses principally on England and the US.  Further research might usefully consider 





In a typical (controversial) English law debt restructuring of a financially distressed SME, the 
owner/managers of the company launch an auction process to sell the business and assets as a 
going concern.  They line up a licensed insolvency practitioner (chosen by, or with the agreement 
of, the bank which finances the company) to act as administrator should the bidding process fail to 
attract sufficient interest to meet all of the company's debts in full, so that the company needs to 
be placed in an insolvency process.  The owner/managers subscribe for all of the shares in a new 
company (bidco).  Bidco bids in the auction at a price slightly above the amount outstanding to the 
seller's fully secured bank, but below the amount sufficient to repay all of the company’s existing 
creditors.  The auction process attracts only low bids, so that bidco is successful. 
 
Bidco then negotiates a sale and purchase agreement with the seller's administrator-in-waiting, 
financing the purchase price by borrowing a fully secured loan from the seller's bank.  Once the 
loan agreement has been agreed with the bank and the sale and purchase agreement has been 
agreed with the seller, the directors of the seller appoint the administrator and place the company 
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 into administration.  In English law this appointment can be made out-of-court.4 The sale and 
purchase agreement is immediately signed by the administrator and bidco, and the purchase price 
is paid to the seller. Together with the owner/managers, the bank agrees with the administrator 
that the seller has five suppliers who should be paid in full for all invoices outstanding at the date 
of the administration.  Many other small suppliers have substantial outstanding debts with the 
company at the administration date but these debts are not paid in full; apart from payments to 
the five selected suppliers, certain amounts due to employees and a small deduction which is 
legally required to be divided amongst all the unsecured creditors, the purchase price is distributed 
to the bank as the seller's secured creditor.5  After the transaction is completed and the economy 
has begun to recover, bidco raises a new, cheaper loan from alternative lenders and repays the 
bank in full.  The owner/managers continue to own all of the shares in the newly restructured 
business. 
 
For some time there has been a sense of moral outrage with this pre-packaged administration 
solution, troubling government and prompting a series of reviews. These reviews have tended to 
concentrate on the question of whether, in our example, the bid vehicle is purchasing the business 
and assets at below market price.6  Yet, as we shall see, when we examine our intuitive reaction to 
this pre-packaged restructuring scenario other circumstances of the case implicate notions of 
fairness. 
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 The SME Restructuring and Principles of Fairness 
 
Fairness, when used in the context of the distribution of money or goods, is strongly associated 
with treating identically situated persons equally or, if there is not enough to go around, at least 
proportionately,7 sometimes referred to as the principle of ‘horizontal equity’.8  Of course, in a real 
world situation we need to decide the criteria by which we will determine whether creditors are 
‘identically situated’ or not.  In other words, some differences will go to the question of 
differentiating the party's claim and others will not.9  In an institutional setting we typically 
develop well-defined criteria by which we decide whether or not one party is equal with another.10  
Sometimes these concepts are codified in rules or laws and sometimes they are simply widely 
understood. 
 
When a company is in administration, the broadest differentiating criterion in English law is 
whether a party has security or not.11  After that, English law chooses to treat some of the claims 
of employees before the claims of other creditors,12 makes a relatively small proportion of the 
realisations of certain secured creditors available to unsecured creditors,13 and elevates the claims 
of creditors who dealt with the administrator after appointment above those of creditors who 
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 have dealt with her before.14  Adopting Walzer's terminology, these rules mark out the principle of 
equal treatment in English insolvency law, and its boundaries.  The first way in which the SME 
restructuring situation makes us uncomfortable is that, as Walzer puts it, ‘something roundabout 
or even clandestine’ seems to be happening which crosses these boundaries.15  The owner/ 
managers and the bank make their determination as to which unsecured creditors to pay in full 
and, as this deviation from the principle of equal treatment happens in a way which is largely 
subjective and unobservable, we have a strong sense of unfairness.  A number of justifications can 
be advanced; crucially, that the suppliers who are paid in full are objectively different because they 
are more critical to the business than the other suppliers and that English insolvency law permits 
payment in full to so-called ‘ransom creditors’ in marking out the principle of equal treatment.16  
Yet no reasons are given to explain why these creditors are critical, and the unpaid trade suppliers 
have no straightforward right of appeal.17  We will return to this issue later when we consider the 
concern for procedural fairness.  
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 It may be possible to justify deviation from the principle of equal treatment on the basis that one 
person is more deserving than another or, on the other hand, to explain our intuitive sense that a 
situation is unfair by concluding that someone has not got what they deserve.  In order to explore 
either claim it is necessary to somehow rank or order what we count as deserving for the purposes 
of reward, and this is further complicated by the fact that the ‘dueness condition’ has both an 
objective and a subjective quality (getting what one believes to be one's due).18 In his examination 
of our biological instinct for what is fair, Sun describes it as a requirement that rewards should be 
proportional to the contribution which a participant has made to the overall endeavour.19  He 
explains that this principle should apply equally in the downside scenario.  In other words, those 
who benefit when things are going well should bear a greater proportional loss when things go 
badly.20    Arneson attributes weight not only to objective considerations, but also to how hard an 
individual has tried, given the particular circumstances in which she finds herself and her particular 
condition.21  This idea of prioritising deservingness based on effort also has a long history, familiar 
in the depression-era concept of the ‘deserving poor’ who struggled with poor background 
conditions but with maximum determination and commitment when compared with the ‘idle rich’.   
It stands in contrast to modern, competitive individualistic doctrine, in which inequalities can be 
justified ‘because they are perceived to be rewards for unequal achievement, talent, rationality 
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 and merit’.22  
 
Whilst the bank may be convinced of the merit-based fairness of the case, there is long run 
evidence in social history of a tendency for wider society to be unimpressed by the ‘mere’ 
contribution of finance.  David Kynaston's four volume history of the City of London provides a rich 
treasure trove of examples,23  and the debate over the social usefulness of much of what the 
finance industry does has been reignited with passion and vigour after the financial crisis by, 
amongst many others, Thomas Pikkety, John Kay and Atif Mian and Amir Sufi.24  Banking in the UK 
has been a virtual oligopoly for almost two centuries and there is a sense (heightened after the 
financial crisis) that the banking community wields significant political power, influencing the 
making of insolvency laws which serve to protect its interests and producing outcomes which are 
unfair.25  In our example, the stranded trade supplier has contributed not just money but also 
commercial effort to the endeavour, but appears to have been inadequately rewarded, whilst the 
bank's position is entirely protected and the owner/managers retain their equity.  Related research 
in the field of group psychology provides further insight.  This research suggests that we tend to 
deny the deservingness of groups to which we do not belong, whilst valuing too highly the rights of 
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 our own group.26  As the distribution to the fully-paid trade creditors relies on the discretionary 
assessment of the owner/managers, the bank and ‘their’ administrator, social psychology would 
suggest that a narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’ could rapidly be constructed, and that the trade supplier 
will develop an in-group identity with all the other unpaid trade suppliers, and contrast it with the 
outcome for the other groups.27   
 
One plausible response to these concerns in the context of a market exchange is that the trade 
suppliers negotiated their supply contracts in the shadow of English restructuring law, and thus 
consented to the position in which they now find themselves.  Many scholars have identified the 
idea of consent as legitimising market exchange, so that questions of fairness do not arise, or at 
least not explicitly.28   In Robert Nozick's work, a market exchange is always voluntary, 
notwithstanding practical considerations which effectively limit choice, provided those exercising 
rights which result in the practical constraints do so legitimately.  Thus, the fact that a small 
supplier is forced to transact as a practical matter on terms which he may not have chosen if he 
had occupied a stronger bargaining position is not sufficient to render his decision-making 
involuntary.29 Consent is also strongly linked to the broader concept of responsibility: a party 
should be held responsible for choices freely made (see, for example, the examination of the 
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 subject by Fleurbaey),30 or even for Dworkin's complex idea of ‘option luck’ (accepting an isolated 
risk such as bankruptcy of a counter party which an individual should have anticipated and might 
have declined) as distinct from ‘brute luck’ (situations which were not in any sense a deliberate 
gamble).31 
 
Yet in the real world of the SME none of these concepts of consent, responsibility or luck takes us 
as far as it might.  We are all aware that under certain conditions, ‘the free market is not all that 
free’,32   and of the superior bargaining position and expertise which the bank had in negotiating a 
fully secured loan agreement, compared with the position of the weaker trade creditor in the 
market.  We suspect that, even if she had wanted to, the small trade creditor could not have 
adjusted the price of the contract to reflect fully her risk on default nor, in many cases, have 
insured against it, and we are familiar with the idea that conditions agreed in the market may be 
suspect as a result of inequality of bargaining power.33  Nozick's work is admirable as a dazzling 
intellectual exercise but nonetheless struggles as a theory which we can relate to our own 
experience of the real world.  We assume that the bank had a team of professional advisers to 
assist it in reaching the best possible deal, and inside knowledge of the situation as it unfolded.  In 
other words, we are dubious about the quality of consent, responsibility or bargained for bad luck.  
As Sandel puts it, ‘Consent matters, even if it is not all there is to justice.  But it is less decisive than 
we sometimes think’.34  Ultimately, the unpaid, unsecured trade creditor is suspected of lacking 
any market power to ensure that the risks which she takes are connected to her actual effort and 
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 initiative.35 
 
Linked to, but somewhat different from, the concept of ‘just deserts’ (and consent) is the idea of 
legitimate expectation.  In other words, when the parties engage in a venture according to defined 
rules they expect all others who have submitted to the same rules to deliver their side of the 
bargain.36  Thus, in dealing with the counter party, the unsecured trade creditor expects her 
contract to be observed to the fullest extent of the counter party's ability, and feels a sense of 
outrage when she concludes that the counter party has not done so.37   Of course, we might argue 
that the contract was concluded in the shadow of restructuring law, so that the weak trade 
supplier consented to the outcome.  We have dealt with that point above, and the arguments 
made there are not repeated here.  Instead, the point is made that the stranded trade supplier 
may object to the SME situation on the basis that her legitimate expectation that she would be 
paid in full or, if not in full, to the maximum extent that the company is able to afford, has not been 
met whilst the equivalent expectations of the bank and the family have been met.  In other words, 
there is a discrepancy between the outcomes which we think ought to prevail and those which 
have.38   
 
The mirror of ‘just desert’ and legitimate expectation for the wronged party is a desire to see those 
who are responsible for loss suffer for the harm which they have inflicted, what Mark Warren calls 
a ‘pathological form of fairness’.39  Sun has shown how hidden elements of our reasoning process 
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 lead us to the ignoble emotion of spite.40 Fleurbaey carefully analyses what he calls the ‘sour 
grapes’ effect and demonstrates that, whilst a consequentialist analysis (with which this article is 
not concerned) might militate against a fresh start for those who have caused the harm, there 
should not be ‘a principled opposition to it’.41  Nonetheless, as Sandel puts it ‘outrage is the special 
kind of anger you feel when you believe that people are getting things they don't deserve’.42  In the 
SME situation, the owner/managers who have brought about the trade creditor's ruin retain all of 
the equity in the business.  The stranded trade creditor may simply want to make them pay. 
 
This brings us to our last, important principle of fairness in the distribution of money or goods: that 
loss should not fall on those least able to bear it. In John Rawls's search for a theory of the ideally 
fair institutions of a sovereign state, the lot of the worst off in society assumes central importance 
in the so-called difference principle – the idea that inequalities can be admitted where, and to the 
extent that, they improve the lot of those worst off in society.43   Work in the biological sciences 
has shown how powerful our compassion for the weak is.44 What is implicated here is a sense of 
‘vertical equity’,45 comparing the position between classes of stakeholder rather than simply the 
position within a class.  It also finds expression in the responsibility debate, ‘What must be done … 
is to determine who in each circumstance class (i.e., a subpopulation of individuals with identical 
circumstances) is worst-off, compare them across classes, and give priority to the worst-off among 
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 them’.46  In the SME case, the weakest trade creditors bear the brunt of the loss. 
 
The SME Restructuring and Procedural fairness 
 
When we think about fairness we think not only about fairness of outcome, but also the fairness of 
the procedure by which the outcome is reached.  Indeed, some scholars would argue that provided 
the procedure is accepted, the result can never be impugned.47  This leaves open the possibility 
that a party who does not like the result claims not to accept the procedure, so that what may 
matter is not whether everyone has agreed to the procedure, but rather whether they would agree 
to it if they were behaving reasonably.48  For the moment the point is made that the procedure 
may be fair if a stakeholder acting reasonably would accept it, even if a stakeholder acting 
unreasonably in the real world rejects it. 
 
For many scholars an important aspect of procedural fairness is the number of voices which are 
heard.49  This may be drawn very widely (because, although the relevant actor is disinterested in 
the particular situation, her voice may have an important and interesting perspective), or may be 
limited to anyone whose interests are involved.50   Research in the fields of social psychology and 
organisation theory suggest that the ability for someone affected by the procedure to be heard 
within it impacts their view of how fairly they have been treated, even if there is no or very limited 
capacity to influence decision making.51  Moreover, a so-called voice system provides feedback to 
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 those running the procedure.  Thus plurality of voice is an important requirement for bankruptcy 
scholars who subscribe to the ‘forum’ view of insolvency; the widest number of perspectives on 
the situation ought to be offered so that no opportunity is overlooked which might otherwise be 
aired.52  This directly impacts on the third reason for voice within the insolvency procedure, in that 
it provides the opportunity to correct a course of action which has been settled on, or to make 
changes going forward.   
 
Whatever view one takes of ‘voice’, and of procedural fairness, in the SME case a limited number 
of stakeholders has the chance actively to participate: the owner/managers, the bank, and an 
administrator chosen by them (with whom we might assume the bank has a pre-existing 
relationship).  An administrator is required to hold a meeting of creditors to discuss her proposals 
for the administration, but not where the company is so insolvent that no return to unsecured 
creditors is anticipated (other than a legislatively fixed small return).53  Moreover, case law has 
established that, even where English insolvency law does require a meeting to be held, when an 
administration sale is ‘pre-packaged’ the administrator is not required to hold the meeting before 
the sale is completed,54 so that creditors are effectively presented with a fait accompli.  
Challenging the administrator's decision to pursue the sale transaction rather than, for example, a 
different debt restructuring transaction is also fraught with difficulty, so that the unpaid suppliers 
lack an effective right to appeal.  Crucially the administrator is entitled to move to a sale 
transaction if she ‘thinks’ it would achieve a better result for creditors as a whole,55  (essentially a 
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 rationality standard),56 and the courts are extremely reluctant to interfere in the administrator's 
commercial decision making.57 Indeed, recent cases have shown just how difficult it is to unwind a 
certain pre-packaged administration sale in order to pursue a different, uncertain debt 
restructuring.58   
 
Of course, building ‘voice’ into the system also gives rise to consequentialist concerns, particularly 
the question of whether the cost of doing so outweighs the benefit.  Indeed, the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 will abolish a number of creditor meetings within the 
insolvency process, apparently as a result of this concern.59  Yet work in organisation theory 
suggests a number of ways in which voice can be built into a procedure efficiently.60    This work in 
organisation theory does, though, give us pause for thought on another issue.  It identifies that a 
significant reason for adopting a voice system is ‘fundamentally to preserve and protect the power 
of those who currently govern the organisation’.61  This leads directly to our next concern: 
eliminating bias and partiality from the system. 
 
Adam Smith employed the idea of the ‘impartial spectator’ in his ethical scheme to examine our 
conduct, and to consider whether that conduct can objectively be regarded as fair.62  This idea of a 
lack of bias, or of impartiality, links both to the question of whether any unequal treatment can be 
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 supported, and the quality of the procedure by which the unequal outcome is arrived at.63  Thus 
John Rawls, in his search for how the fairness ideal should be embedded within political 
institutions, employed the thought experiment of a hypothetical agreement by members of society 
in the original position behind a thick veil of ignorance.  In other words, Rawls strives for an 
objective or impartial assessment of the fairness condition by stripping his imagined actors of any 
knowledge of the attributes which they will have, and the conditions which they will be in, in a real 
world setting.64   
 
Once we consider the demand to avoid bias as a ‘foundational idea’ of fairness,65 the SME case 
makes us still more uneasy.  First, the choices between which suppliers to pay and which to leave 
unpaid are reached by parties who are clearly insiders, and who have strong, vested interests to 
influence their decision making.  Moreover, the appointment of the administrator out of court 
means that judges who are screened for, and subjected to rules to remove, concerns of bias so that 
they can preside over disputes where questions of fairness of outcome and of process might arise 
are not involved in the decision making.66 The administrator has been selected and paid for by the 
owner/managers and the bank.  The administrator is a repeat player, and likely to be influenced by 
the bank's wishes,67 so that she is not in fact the disinterested gatekeeper which we might like her 
to be.  This problem with identifying a truly neutral gatekeeper is a familiar one: it has been 
identified in the work of Enriques and Macey on independent valuers in share transactions,68 in 
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 work on ombudsmen in organisation theory,69 in post financial crisis literature on the role of the 
rating agencies,70 and explicitly in the literature on administration.71  It is an explicit policy 
objective of the US Chapter 11 process to eliminate bias by providing a central role for the court, 
whilst the court has a minimal role in an English administration.  Once again efficiency concerns 
outside the scope of this article come into play, but once again our examination of the meta-
fairness of the case helps us to identify the issues with which we are concerned.  Ultimately, we 
suspect that the decision which was reached did not put questions of power aside, and thus did 
not arrive at an impartial decision. 
 
The idea of protection against abuse of power is also fundamental to our sense of fairness.  Often, 
when we refer to an unfair outcome or process we mean that one of the participants has exploited 
their position of power so as to be able to bend the rules of the game to their own advantage, and 
in a way which is inappropriate to the nature of the activity which they are participating in.72  Thus 
Rawls's thick veil of ignorance strips the parties of the ability to gain bargaining advantage over 
one another.73 This leads to difficult questions about delineating the point at which it ceases to be 
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 morally legitimate to use bargaining strength to improve one's position.74  But the ideal is that the 
system should control abuses in such a way that no-one in a position of power is able to gain an 
advantage which she does not deserve merely through the exercise of that power.  The SME 
situation gives us cause for concern that the vulnerable trade creditors have not been protected 
from the power of the bank, part of the financial elite, by the appointment of an administrator 
chosen by them.  Moreover, the family are clearly powerful insiders in the case and have better 
information which they are able to exploit in reaching their desired outcome. 
 
In sum, whilst other considerations may make the SME scenario the best policy solution, it 
nonetheless triggers many concerns which are bundled in different combinations in our own 
concept of what is fair.  Importantly, these concerns go beyond the policy focus on the price at 
which the sale transaction is completed.  It is tempting to hold that the analysis is the same in any 
corporate restructuring where some creditors are excluded, but as we shall see the analysis needs 
to be revisited where only financial creditors are implicated, or where we are concerned with the 
special situation of a financial institution.  Fairness considerations in debt restructuring are not 
generisable because they are intrinsically related to the circumstances of the case. 
 
LARGE CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 
 
Many private equity sponsors finance acquisitions of large corporates through a small amount of 
equity and significant amounts of debt (so that the loans are known as ‘leveraged loans’).75  The 
                                                 
74
 See J.E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 91-92. 
75
 For an explanation of why the private equity industry favours this model, see L. Gullifer and J. Payne, Principles of 
Corporate Finance (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2015), 776. 
 debt is often divided into a senior secured loan, and a loan or loans which are also secured but 
which rank behind (or junior) to the senior loan in insolvency (and which consequently attract 
higher pricing).    
 
Of course, one of the consequences of carrying a significant amount of debt is that the company 
has a relatively high interest bill to pay.  Furthermore, before the financial crisis, most European 
leveraged loan agreements contained financial covenants which tested, on an ongoing basis or 
periodically, whether the borrower’s financial health was being maintained (for example, by testing 
that the ratio of financial indebtedness to earnings remained within prescribed levels).76  If these 
financial covenant ratios were breached, the lenders became entitled to accelerate the loan and 
demand that it was immediately repaid, so that if the loan could not be refinanced the company 
would become insolvent.  Many private equity transactions faced debt service or financial 
covenant compliance problems during the financial crisis, and the market value of the companies 
at the time was often significantly less than their debt.  In these circumstances, one common 
approach was to seek to swap some or all of the company's senior loans into equity but (after five 
to ten per cent of the equity had been reserved for management to incentivise them) to offer 
nothing or only a very small amount for the junior lenders.  If there was disagreement about the 
debt-for-equity swap amongst the senior lenders it was common to take advantage of England's 
scheme of arrangement procedure which enabled the transaction to be imposed on the senior 
lenders with a lower threshold than the unanimous consent mandated in the loan agreement.  If 
the junior lenders sought to challenge the transaction (or threatened to do so), the scheme of 
arrangement could be ‘twinned’ with a pre-packaged administration pursuant to which the 
company's business and assets were sold to a new vehicle owned by the converting lenders in 
return for a release of their debt (which usually exceeded the current market price for the business 
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 and assets), leaving the junior creditors stranded in the ‘old’ company which had been stripped 
bare.  During the restructuring negotiations, it was common for the debt to trade widely, so that 
the creditors who eventually entered into the restructuring had often acquired their interest at a 
discount.   In the years after the worst of the crisis, in an improved macroeconomic environment, it 
was often possible to sell or list the shares in the newly restructured company for a substantial 
profit. 
 
The Large Corporate Restructuring and Principles of Fairness 
 
English law clearly marks the boundaries of the principle of equal treatment in a scheme of ar-
rangement first, by requiring a determination as to whether creditors can vote as a single class, or 
should be divided into separate classes for voting purposes,77 and secondly, by mandating that the 
scheme can only proceed if creditors in each separate class accounting for a majority in number 
and 75 per cent in value of the claims present and voting in that class vote in favour of the 
scheme.78  A body of case law has developed which indicates that the crucial question for the pur-
poses of determining who is to be placed in each class is the rights which the members of the class 
have before, and the rights which they will receive in, the scheme,79  so that in the large corporate 
scenario it is likely that the senior lenders will vote as a single class.  At first sight, therefore, no 
particular concern for ‘horizontal equity’ arises.   
However, matters are not quite so straightforward.  It is possible, for example, that some of the 
senior lenders voting on the scheme have entered into lock-up agreements in which they commit 
to support the scheme before it is proposed, have received consent fees in return for voting in 
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 support of the scheme, hold an interest in another part of the company's capital structure which 
may influence their overall assessment of the restructuring or are content to support the scheme 
only because of the discount at which they acquired their interest. As a result, after voting on the 
scheme, a second court hearing is held at which the court decides whether to sanction the 
scheme.  At sanction the court will be alert to the possibility that ‘… any group of creditors even in 
properly constituted classes have been unfairly coerced by the majority within their class in terms 
of having been corralled by people whose rights appear similar but whose objectives and interests 
were poles apart’.80   
Furthermore, if the junior creditors are not offered anything, and the scheme is to be twinned with 
a pre-packaged administration sale in order to strand them in an empty shell company, the junior 
creditors will have no vote in the scheme because, strictly, they are not being asked to vote on a 
change in their rights.  In other words, the company is entitled to leave them out of the scheme of 
arrangement.81  However, a party who is left outside the scheme can appear at the sanction 
hearing to argue that the scheme is unfair because the class of creditor of which she is a member 
should properly have been offered something within it. The English court will address this question 
by determining whether the creditors who have been left out of the scheme retain an economic 
interest in the company so that they should have been offered some consideration in it.82   In 
determining whether the creditors have such an economic interest, the English court puts 
particular weight on the position the creditors would be in if the scheme of arrangement were not 
sanctioned. Where the company is financially distressed, this typically leads to an inquiry into 
whether the price which an administrator would receive in a market sale of the business and 
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 assets at the time of the restructuring would be sufficient to make a distribution to the creditors 
excluded from the scheme.  However, asset prices may be generally depressed if there has been a 
slowdown in the business or finance cycle.83  This means that even though the current market 
price may indicate that the excluded creditors have no economic interest in the company, if the 
other creditors receive all of the equity in the company in exchange for their debt in the scheme of 
arrangement they may make a significant profit when asset prices recover.   
 
To address this concern, US bankruptcy law adopts a valuation standard based on professional 
valuation opinions, rather than current market price established through an auction process.84  
Thus it does not decide who should receive an equity allocation in the debt restructuring based on 
the current price in the market, but rather adopts traditional valuation techniques such as 
discounted cash flow, comparable transaction and private equity valuations in an attempt to give 
more credit for the prospect of a post-restructuring recovery in the price of the business and 
assets than a purchaser in the distressed market at the time of the sale might be willing to give.  
The very existence of this alternative is significant, because research into how we perceive 
unfairness has shown that it is in part determined by our ability to think about alternatives.85  It 
has given rise to lively debate amongst judges, scholars and practitioners as to whether senior 
creditors in an English restructuring receive ‘too good a deal’,86 and whether England should move 
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 towards the US approach.87  
 
In addressing the fairness aspect of this question, and leaving aside the broader advantages and 
disadvantages of the US approach,88  we must remember the socio-historical context in which the 
valuation approach in Chapter 11 was adopted.  It is tempting to see it as what Sen has called a 
‘transcendental framework’,89 in other words an objective standard of what is fair in a debt 
restructuring formulated and developed by the brilliant academics who designed Chapter 11 
independently of the action and behaviour in bankruptcy which they saw at the time.   If this were 
the case, then the normative distributional concerns of Chapter 11 would remain constant over 
time.  However, it is suggested that there is considerable ‘historical conditioning’ in the theory,90 
and that it was very much a product of what the academics saw of the actual operation of debt 
restructuring.  In particular, in the 1970s when Chapter 11 was developed, it was usual to 
compromise trade creditors in a large, corporate debt restructuring as well as in an SME 
restructuring.  In other words, there would have been fewer contextual differences between the 
SME restructuring and a large corporate restructuring.  Thus we must be very cautious about how 
we apply ‘inherited ideas and concepts’91 to the new situation with which we are faced, conscious 
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 that ‘ideas have a genealogy of their own’.92 
 
We should, therefore, pause to ask ourselves what we mean by ‘too good a deal’ in this scenario.  
We do not mean that the quality of what the parties has contributed, or the effort they have 
dedicated to supporting the endeavour, is somehow different.  Each has contributed money, and it 
is likely that none of them played a particularly active role in monitoring the financial health of the 
company, or acting as a ‘whistle blower’, as might once have been the case.93  Crucially, the junior 
debt will have attracted higher pricing than the senior debt to reflect its increased riskiness on 
default, recalling Sun’s requirement that the quality of receiving what one deserves applies in the 
downside as well as the upside.94  We might argue, therefore, that provided the legal 
consequences were known in advance, in this scenario concepts of ‘deservedness’ are of 
considerably reduced significance.  We might also despatch the requirement for satisfaction of 
‘legitimate expectations’ in the same way. 
 
The principle of free exchange in which the junior creditors consented to, are responsible for and 
took calculated chances on the situation in which they now find themselves is also more 
compelling in this scenario than in the SME scenario.   These are financial creditors who have the 
full gamut of investment opportunities available to them.  They are likely to be properly advised, 
and to understand the risks which they are taking.  We do not have the same sense of a 
sophisticated insider of the financial elite pitched against a rookie.  To the extent that the financial 
creditor represents a pension fund seeking the high risk, high return investment necessary to meet 
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 the requirements of an ageing population, we might argue that the pension fund has no more 
choice in investment selection than the weaker trade creditor, and no better ability to adjust price 
in competitive market conditions.  We might be sceptical about the ability of investment managers 
accurately to predict and price for risk of and return on default, so that a US approach to valuation 
becomes crucial to protect pension investments for wider society, or conversely we might be 
confident that investors can predict and price risk and return on default, so that we fear the 
traditional English approach has an impact on the availability of credit.  Or we might fear that 
unless we move to a system more recognisable to US creditors, they will not be willing to 
undertake the necessary learning process to feel happy to invest in businesses in the UK at a time 
when we are keen to attract direct foreign investment.95  These are vast issues and for another day.  
For the moment, the point is made once again that the argument is not that current corporate 
restructuring practice meets the paradigmatic trade-off between fairness and other 
considerations.  Rather it is that the extent to which the situation falls short of our notions of 
fairness is not as extreme as it is in the SME case where a classic battle is fought between the weak 
and the strong.  In the same way, whilst the argument that loss should not fall on those least able 
to bear it resonated in the context of weak trade creditors ranked against powerful financial 
creditors, it has less salience when we are considering financial creditor pitched against financial 
creditor. 
 
One of the criticisms of financial markets after the financial crisis is the apparent absence of 
cultural or ethical norms to control bad behaviour.96  This is most commonly ascribed to 
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 globalisation and diversification of the market: it is well documented that cultural norms are 
seeded and thrive best in relatively homogenous groups.97  Yet this belies a fundamental shift in 
ideas.  Modern markets do not look to the era of gentlemanly codes of conduct with misty-eyed 
nostalgia.98  There is a well-documented dark-side to homogenous groups with strong codes of 
behaviour: the codes which develop to keep members in the group may equally well be used to 
keep others out.99  Indeed, well-known work in the 1950s lamented the complacent and sluggish 
state of American capitalism and the apparent stifling of entrepreneurialism.100  In contrast, 
Pikkety has described the ‘meritocratic extremism’ of modern markets,101  and modern finance 
markets are more likely to judge a situation solely by an economic calculus.  Of course, this raises 
issues too extensive to investigate here.  But one benefit of a market bonded by an economic 
calculus is its ‘hyper-rationality’, in other words, its reluctance to allow emotional responses, such 
as spite, to play any role in determining the economically rational response.  Thus it is arguably less 
likely that there will be a sense of a need for retributive justice when the creditors who have 
suffered the harm are sophisticated economic actors. 
 
 
The Large Corporate Restructuring and Procedural Fairness 
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 We may still have some concerns for procedural fairness because it is likely that the administrator 
is appointed by management together with the senior creditors, and we may remain concerned 
that the ‘voice’ of the junior creditors is not adequately heard.  Moreover, although in our example 
the pre-packaged administration is ‘twinned’ with a scheme of arrangement providing a forum for 
objections, in another case where the senior creditors are ad idem the pre-packaged 
administration may be used alone to strand the junior financial creditors much as it was used in 
the SME case to strand trade creditors.  However, it is still likely that the junior lenders are 
sophisticated financial creditors who are aware how a transaction of this type is likely to play out.  
They have the financial wherewithal to employ professional advisers to put their legal and 
economic arguments, and are unlikely to be wholly excluded from the process, or to be surprised 
by it.102  Whereas it will have been a key part of the strategy of the SME case to keep the 
transaction from as many trade creditors as possible, precisely to ensure that they continued to 
deal with the company in the shadow of the pre-packaged administration, no such concerns arise 
in speaking to the junior creditors.  This is because it is likely that the junior creditors will be 
prohibited by the terms of the inter-creditor agreement from taking action against the company in 
the negotiation period.103  These creditors do not require a formal voice system in order to access 
decision makers – they are perfectly capable of doing so themselves. 
 
Moreover, whilst the investment bank's valuation (and any marketing process which supports it) is 
crucial to the outcome, and we may have concerns about the independence of management in 
producing the business plan on which the valuation will depend (particularly given the equity 
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 which they stand to gain in the transaction ranking behind a much reduced debt burden),104 the 
quality of the bias problem is arguably different from the SME situation.  First, as noted above 
there is significantly less selection between equally situated creditors.  Secondly, although the 
administrator in this scenario is likely to have been retained by those leading the transaction, she is 
also likely to have worked in other situations in which creditors who are currently in the junior 
debt held the fulcrum securities.105  In other words, whereas in the SME transaction she is likely to 
have overriding loyalty for the single player whose patronage is crucial for future appointments,106  
her long-run loyalties are less clear in this situation.  We may have concerns that the situation is 
not as free from bias as we might ideally like, but it stands at a shorter distance from that position 
than the SME case.  We have thus already trailed, and can dispatch relatively quickly, discussion of 
protection against abuse of power.  In the large corporate restructuring scenario we have painted 
we are dealing with the ‘high hats’ of the financial elite.107  We have already examined the reduced 
patronage concerns in the appointment of the administrator.  We have also touched on the 
advisory team available to the junior creditor, and their implicit understanding of the situation. 
 
In sum, the argument is not that the large corporate debt restructuring represents the 
paradigmatic marriage of fairness and efficiency.  There may be other, fairer outcomes which are 
supportable or good arguments (outside the scope of this article) for preferring another solution 
on the basis that it will, for example, improve ex ante investment incentives which will encourage 
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 the raising of capital, or create better incentives ex post for the directors, or protect pension funds 
for wider society.  Instead, the point is made that the large corporate situation is not as far away 
from what we might regard as the ideally fair solution as that of the SME restructuring.  In other 
words, we need to adjust how we think about fairness in the new circumstances of the case.  As 
we shall see, this need critically to assess our mode of thinking about notions of fairness comes 
into stark relief in the context of financial institutions. 
 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RESTRUCTURING 
 
Before the crisis many US financial institutions had issued bonds backed by residential mortgage 
loans to low income families in the United States (so-called sub-prime mortgages).  Often the 
purchase of these residential mortgages had been funded through the short term money markets, 
and the mortgages were subsequently packaged together (or securitised) to support highly rated 
bonds.  This proved a very attractive line of business, but eventually the funding market, and the 
market which traded in the securities, began to doubt the quality of the mortgages in the 
portfolios.  Funding liquidity in the money market and the interbank market abruptly dried up.  
This meant that European financial institutions which had relied heavily on these markets for 
funding were no longer able to access them.  At the same time, many of these institutions had also 
invested heavily in the US sub-prime securitisations, so that the asset side of their balance sheets 
took a heavy hit.  During the financial crisis, European governments dealt with this by using 
taxpayers' money to recapitalise the banks' balance sheets and to provide them with funding 
liquidity; in other words, the banks were bailed out.  After the financial crisis the ‘bail-in’ tool has 
been developed, enabling the authorities forcibly to convert certain liabilities of distressed 
financial institutions into equity, recapitalising the relevant institution's balance sheet and 
rebuilding confidence in it.  Insofar as the fairness analysis is concerned, many of the same 
 considerations apply to bail-in as in the large corporate debt-for-equity swap scenario.  But there 
are certain crucial distinctions introduced into the fairness analysis by the fact that the entity to be 
restructured is a regulated financial institution. 
 
The Financial Institution Restructuring and Principles of Fairness 
 
In the era before the Great Depression bank runs were a common feature of the US business cycle.  
Often it was not clear what sparked the loss of confidence in an institution, but once the 
psychological fear gripped depositors, the bank could fail with frightening speed.  Depositors 
rushed to withdraw their cash, and the bank, in a desperate attempt to stave off financial collapse, 
began to liquidate assets at fire-sale prices.108  It was all too easy for the situation to spread to 
other financial institutions.  In the Depression era it became clear that mechanisms were needed 
to improve depositor confidence.   This led to a number of reforms, including the introduction of 
deposit insurance,109 and legislation to ring fence deposit taking business from other business so 
that depositors could have confidence that their deposits were not being used to fund other, risky 
activities. 110  After these steps were implemented the rate and volume of bank failures slowed 
dramatically in the US, and US and UK finance markets entered an extended period of relative 
stability which came to be known as the Great Moderation.111 
 
Deposit insurance, however, creates a risk of ‘moral hazard’:  bank executives inured against the 
risk of having insufficient assets to meet deposit obligations (because the deposit insurer is 
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 standing by to meet the liability, should it arise) take ever riskier action.112  At the same time, 
before the crisis deposit insurance was capped at a relatively low level in the UK so that it did not 
provide much comfort to modern depositors, and it did not cover (and so did not reassure) the 
money and interbank funding markets.113  Ring fencing of operations never arrived in the UK and 
was lifted in the US in 1999.114  The structure of the finance market changed, with increasingly 
complex financial arrangements of the type described above (the effects of which were not 
entirely understood),115 and a growth in the so-called shadow banking system outside the 
regulated sector.116  Assumptions that the post-Depression era reforms, sound central bank policy 
and a better understanding of the business cycle meant there would never again be a bust in the 
financial system proved to be groundless.   Nonetheless, the financial crisis revealed an economic 
imperative to rescue financial institutions because of a fear that collapse would threaten the fabric 
of the financial system of the country.  Scholars studying the Great Depression had criticised the 
response of the US Federal Reserve (the central bank) and Government, holding them partly 
responsible for the depth of the crisis in the 1930s by, amongst other things, failing to respond 
with rapid injections of sufficient liquidity for the struggling financial sector.117  Many of the policy 
actors in the financial crisis had studied the response to the Depression and had learnt these 
lessons.118  As a result, the UK Government stepped in, using taxpayers' money to restore banks' 
balance sheets, and in doing so revealed that before the crisis banks had been able to raise debt 
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 very cheaply because lenders had anticipated precisely this result.119 In the post-mortem this has 
been seen as intolerable to public opinion, and the political imperative that it should never be 
allowed to happen again is at the heart of the post-crisis legal and regulatory response. 
 
 A significant development has been the incorporation of the so-called bail-in tool in the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (henceforth the BRRD),120 implemented in the UK through 
amendments to the Banking Act 2009.  The bail-in tool effectively enables the regulator to compel 
holders of certain debt instruments issued by the bank to swap them for equity.  This will 
immediately reduce pressure on the bank's balance sheet and, it is hoped, restore confidence in it.  
It is also designed to remove the implicit government subsidy for banks by making it more realistic 
for regulators to restructure a distressed financial institution rather than bailing it out.  As a result, 
bail-in risk should henceforth be priced into the cost of bank debt.  However, in order to adjust the 
price of lending to reflect bail-in risk, a creditor needs reasonable transparency as to how the bail-
in will occur.  To this end, the European Banking Authority has issued a series of regulatory 
mandates, designed to ensure a reasonably uniform approach between member states on the 
treatment of capital in bail-in.  At the time of writing the regulatory mandates remain in draft form, 
but the relevant ones for the purposes of allocating consideration (and, therefore, losses) in a 
restructuring are the Draft Guidelines on the Rate of Conversion of Debt to Equity in Bail-in, Draft 
Guidelines on Treatment of Liabilities in Bail-in, Draft Guidelines on Treatment of Shareholders First 
in Bail-in and Draft Technical Standards on Valuation in Bail-in.121  Of course, the long-run relevance 
of the BRRD, and the regulatory mandates which will accompany it, remains in some doubt in the 
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 UK since the vote of the people of the UK to leave the European Union in the EU referendum on 23 
June 2016.  Nonetheless, analysis of the EU position will be relevant whatever approach is 
ultimately taken in the ensuing EU negotiations. 
 
To this end, the draft guidelines reveal a somewhat Byzantine structure for the valuation exercise.  
One valuation is carried out by an independent valuer in order to determine the rate of conversion 
of the debt and allocation of equity amongst debt holders.  This is done by valuing the bank as a 
going concern after it has been successfully restructured, broadly similar to the use of valuation 
opinions for large corporate restructurings in US bankruptcy described above.  A second valuation 
is carried out (both before and after bail-in) to determine the treatment which creditors would 
have received if the financial institution had been placed into an insolvency proceeding rather than 
being restructured using the bail-in tool.  As in the traditional English approach in a large corporate 
restructuring, this valuation is likely to be done using current prices for the bank's assets if they 
were sold in the market at the time of the restructuring.  If a creditor is able to show that she is in 
a worse position after bail-in than she would have been in if the financial institution had been 
placed in an insolvency process and its assets realised and the proceeds distributed, she may bring 
a claim under the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle enshrined in the BRRD.122  But this may be 
challenging if the bank is facing distress at a low point in the finance cycle when there may be a 
general lack of funding for banks in the market, so that many banks may be trying to sell assets at 
the same time to raise funds and there will be few buyers.  As more banks seek to sell assets, 
prices become increasingly depressed, further weakening banks' balance sheets and thus requiring 
more asset sales to raise funds.  This may mean that prices for the bank's assets are particularly 
depressed at the time of the bail-in.123  It would therefore seem to be more promising for a 
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 creditor to argue for a greater allocation of equity in the bail-in based on the post-restructuring 
value of the bank.   However, it is not at all clear what a creditor can do if she disagrees with the 
going concern assessment for the purposes of the second valuation, as the only explicit right of 
appeal in the BRRD is the no creditor worse off principle based on the insolvency valuation. 
 
To the extent that the valuation standards are intended to enable the market to reach a firm view 
on the position on default, both in deciding to lend and in pricing the lending decision, so that the 
treatment of the capital in bail-in is legitimised by consent, responsibility and luck, we might have 
expected clearer standards and clearer rights.  This would also address the now familiar charge 
that creditors have not received what is due to them because, once again, it is suggested that 
provided the operation of the valuation standards is clear no principled fairness concern arises in 
the context of bail-in of sophisticated market actors investing in complex debt.124  To the extent 
that we are concerned with ‘deservedness’ we may simply limit ourselves to clear and transparent 
rules.  As before, this should ensure that the legitimate expectations of powerful market actors are 
met.   
 
This analysis is reinforced in the unique situation of financial institution restructuring when we 
consider the fairness principle that loss should not fall on those least able to bear it.  Whilst this 
was not a tremendously meaningful concept when we considered allocation of losses amongst 
financial creditors in the large corporate scenario, in the context of a financial institution, it is an 
explicit policy objective that losses should not fall on the taxpayer.  Thus, as explained at the 
                                                 
124
 As before, we may conclude that other considerations (such as the need to encourage investment in the regulatory 
capital of financial institutions or to protect investment made by professional investment managers of pension funds 
for wider society) militate against a more brutal allocation of value.  But if this were the motivation, we would expect 
to see clearer rights accompanying the post-restructuring going concern standard. 
 beginning, much of the post crisis response has been about ensuring that the system can absorb 
failure without implicating taxpayers’ money.  There are many aspects to this, but in the context of 
bail-in of bank capital it is a clear plank of the valuation standards.  It is also explicable in the 
limited legal right to complain based on the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle.  Yet the role of the 
going concern valuation is not clear, and whilst it seems unlikely that it will positively impact ex 
ante lending behaviour (because of its very uncertain role and the lack of clearly enforceable rights 
which relate to it) it does seem to open up the possibility of litigation ex post with all of the 
attendant costs for the taxpayer.  The question then arises as to whether concern for procedural 
fairness motivated the complex valuation structure. 
 
The Financial Institution Restructuring and Procedural fairness 
 
The financial institution bail-in solution can be imposed on the creditors in a UK financial 
institution by the Bank of England.125   Thus concerns about procedural fairness in this case may 
reflect concerns about controlling regulatory behaviour, particularly the exorbitant exercise of 
regulatory discretion.126  Put shortly the concern emerges that regulators who have been provided 
with extensive regulatory tools will have an overwhelming desire to exercise them, and a new vein 
of literature relating to regulatory accountability is implicated.    However, it is important that we 
identify this as the new concern in assessing the fairness of the procedure because, whilst the 
control of regulators has some parallels with the control of market actors explored in the other two 
situations, it also raises different issues around public interest.  It also leads directly to a concern 
with protection against abuse of regulatory power.   
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 This concern appears to manifest itself in the BRRD with the extension of valuation to going 
concern value as well as liquidation value.  However, given that the only clear legal right is that 
provided by the no creditor worse off principle, we might ask to what extent that ambition is met.  
If we are genuinely concerned with abuse of regulatory power, we might wish to provide stronger 
enforcement rights for creditors who feel that they should have received a greater allocation on a 
post bail-in going concern basis.  An alternative possibility is that the real benefit of the going 
concern valuation step comes from making the regulatory process seem, rather than be, fair.127   As 
discussed in the SME situation, work in the field of organisation theory suggests that acceptance of 
a system may be reinforced by an aura of fairness, even if the changes to the system do not render 
it fairer in any substantive sense, and notwithstanding that the effect of such a system is to 
reinforce the acceptance, and therefore the power, of those in control of it rather than to level the 
playing field.  It may be, therefore, that the going concern valuation exists to provide what we 
might call surface fairness rather than a deep convergence towards a fairness standard.  Or it may 
be that it has arisen from the debate around valuation standards in large corporate debt 
restructuring and that that is why the overall system lacks clear policy coherence.  In other words, 
it is not clear to what extent the policy prescription has arisen from a clear analysis of the meta-




Ultimately, there seems to be a lack of clear thinking about the normative concerns for fairness in 
the reform efforts around connected party SME pre-packaged administrations, the current debate 
around valuation standards in large corporate debt restructuring and the evolving valuation 
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 standards for the BRRD.  Each scenario examined neatly illustrates the point which we started with.  
Not only do we always need to be mindful of other considerations which ought to prevail over our 
notions of fairness when determining policy responses in restructuring, we must also be clear what 
the normative concerns for fairness are which we are weighing in the balance.  In other words, we 
must be mindful not simply to rely on intuitions or instincts but rather must critically examine the 
elements of our loose notions of fairness.  Most importantly of all, we should be especially careful 
not simply to translate notions of fairness from one circumstance to another, without assessing 
whether some adjustment is required.   
 
Thus it is that, in the context of SME debt restructuring, one of our dominant normative concerns 
should be the extent to which debt restructuring procedures can address substantive and 
procedural unfairness which arises between creditors, perhaps by reducing the ability of insiders to 
protect themselves in the shadow of insolvency law or reducing the right of some creditors to 
claim a ransom position.  We will, of course, have to weigh these normative concerns for fairness 
against other normative concerns (such as the availability and cost of capital for healthy SMEs), but 
classic concerns for distributional and procedural fairness are likely to be a significant part of our 
analysis.  However, when we consider large corporate debt restructurings implicating only financial 
creditors we are less likely to be concerned with unfairness between market participants, and 
more concerned with how our policy choices affect the market for credit for healthy companies (by 
negatively impacting the availability of finance or the cost of finance) or our ability to invest for a 
rapidly ageing population (because much of the money at stake is invested by pension and 
insurance funds on behalf of us all in search of the necessary yield).   When we come to financial 
institutions, different considerations apply again.  We are concerned with unfairness but this time 
between the market and the taxpayer and (perhaps) between the market and the regulator rather 
than with unfairness between the market participants.  So fairness matters, but the fairness 
 question has a different quality.   Thus when we weigh our normative concerns for fairness against 
the consequences of our choices for the ability of financial institutions to raise adequate capital at 
an appropriate (but affordable) price, quite different fairness concerns go into the scales. 
 
At the time of writing, the Insolvency Service is consulting on reform of the corporate insolvency 
framework in England and Wales, the European Commission has published a draft directive on 
substantive minimum standards in preventative restructuring frameworks in the EU and work 
continues on finalising the regulatory mandates for valuation in financial institution restructuring.  
These are certainly busy times.  Yet it is vitally important that in our haste we also take time to 
identify what type of debt restructuring is targeted in each of these reform efforts, and that in 
each case we carefully and specifically locate our fairness (and other) normative concerns within it.  
If we do this, we will find that a single reform initiative cannot arrive at the right balance for all 
cases.   In other words, policy missteps are inevitable unless we cease generalising our normative 
fairness concerns in debt restructuring, and take seriously the exercise of considering them in the 
factual context within which they arise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
